Abstract: Rudolf von lhering was the leading German philosopher of law of the nineteenth century. He was also a major source of Weber's more famous sociological definitions of action. Characteristically, Weber transfonned material he found: in this case lhering's attempt to reconcile the causaland teleological aspects of action. In Ihering's hands these become, respectively, the extemal and in~emal moments of action, or intentional thought and the factual consequences of action. For Weber they are made into epistemic aspects of action, the causal and the meaningful, each of which is essential to an account of action, but which are logically and epistemically distinct. Ihering thought purposes were the products of underlying interests, but included 'ideal' interests in this category. Weber radicalized this by expanding the category and making it historically central. This radicalization bears on rational choice theory: if ideal interests have a Iarge historical role independent of material interests, and are not fully explicable on such grounds as 'sour grapes', the methods appropriate to the study of the transfonnation of ideas, meaning genealogies in the Nietzschean seose, are cen~ral to the explanation of action.
historically: return to the situation ante sociology and reconsider the departure that sociology represents.
Two closely related figures in the history of social thought, Weber and the philosopher of law Rudolf von Ihering, are crucial to an answer to this question. Ihering was perhaps the rnost persistent pursuer of the strategy of providing accounts of social practices which interpreted them as resting on agreements between persons with distinct interests.
1 This may be said to be the generic explanatory strategy of rational choice theory with respect to social norms. In Ihering's hands, the evolution of interests was the focus of discussion. The evolution of law, and particularly legal rights, was the primary explanandurn. But Ihering bad a great deal to say about social practices that were not legal, for reasons that lie at the core of the issue of the adequacy of utilitarianisrn.
Like Jon Elster today, Ihering grasped that the devices which the utilitarians ernployed to explain social institutions were insufficient -that there was, in Elster's language, an "unknown residual", leftover in the reduction of norms to self-interest., Ihering's argurnents stressed the "insufficiency" of standard reductions of law to interests, while at the sametime arguing, rnuch like Elster, that the most visible and important facts about social norms, and particularly legal norms and legal authority, bad to be understood as outcomes of, and partial resolutions of, conflicts of interests. Elster identifies another "unknown residual" in the sbaping of subjective pretenses through the rnechanisrn of adjustrnent to opportunities. Ihering approached this rnore directly by differentiating "material" and "ideal" interests and considering the means by which novel ideal interests carne into being. Weber radicalized Ihering's thoughts on this subject (Tumer/Factor 1987) . But at the sametimehe reconstructed the concept of action that Ihering bad formulated. This reconstruction is crucial to the problern of the status of normative ideas, and raises broader questions about the explanation of action and the explanatory status of rationalizations of action, and also about the epistemic status of assertions about the reasons and causes of an action.
Basic Accounts of Action
Zweck im Recht (Law as a Means to an End) is a child of its times with respect to its starting point, the problern of cause and teleology. Ihering ernbraces the "law. of causality", tbat every change in the world sense is a consequence of an antecedent change, and extends it to movements of the will. But the psychological antecedents to action are purposes -"no volition, or, whicb istbesame thing, no action, without purpose• (1968, 2) . The concept of action is tbus defined by tbe psycbological fact of purpose: "purpose" is a criterion of "action•. Purpose requires an idea of tbe future, wbicb provides tbe object of willing, and tbus requires understanding and the "category of possibility" (1968, 3, 6 ). This excludes a !arge range of behavior, such as habitual action, and the unconscious or "purposeless" actions of tbe insane. Action has an "intemal stage", which begins with an act of ideation or representation of a possible future state which promises the subject greater satisfaction than bis present state. These tboughts are conditioned by intemal and extemal influences, but extemal influences do not bave "direct power" over tbe will -they acquire power only by being converted into motives, and what motives they are converted to depends on tbe measure of resistance they find in tbe subject, wbich is to say, tbe good or bad will (1968, 8) . Possible courses are presented to tbe will by the facilities of ideation and desire, and tbe will balances tbe reasons and chooses (1968, 8 ).
Ihering' s account of tbe stages of action resolves tbe problern of cause and teleology: the illternal stage is govemed by the law of purpose; tbe extemal stage by the law of causality. The intemal stage ends with the "resolution, the act by which the will relieves itself of further balancing" (1968, 15) . The extemal stage begins here: the will requires tbe cooperation of natural laws in this stage. The will, however, is its own source of causal force, independent of tbe "law of causality•. No one can be directly forced to wiU, though the will may be affected "immediately" , for example, by means of psychological pressure (1968, 17) . But tbe will must capitulate to this pressure to be affected by it.
The "law of purpose" that govems the intemal stage is a bit mysterious. Ihering wants a "law" in the sense of a parallel to the Kantian category of causality. He finds it in tbe idea that "an act without a purpose is just as much an impossibility as is an effect without a cause" (1968, 9) . To "prove" this as a "law" he proceeds in a Kantian way. He responds to the two objections he can conceive, tbe first being that we may be compeUed to act, for example, by duty or by the law, the second that actions of the insane and actions that are so babitual we "no Ionger think in tbe course of doing them" (1968, 10) are nevertheless actions. His response is to pointout tbat the term 'because' and 'in order to' may be used interchangeably in tbe case of action, but only where tbe reason it connects to the action is imelligible as reason. His discussion of this point is slight: he gives tbe example of a person who said he drank "because it rained yesterday" rather tban "because I am thirsty". In this case, be says, there is no visible connection between the reason assigned and the drinking (1968, 10) . Acting out of duty or legal compulsion is acting with a reason, hence it is action. Acting under physical compulsion or threat is also action in the sense of "an actual act of the will and not merely the outward appearance of such" (1968, 11) . The Roman jurists, he points out, established that. Habitual action is also action with a purpose, but by repetition the purposes have been bound to the act to such an extent that "the purpose has ceased to be a consciously perceptible element of the voluntary process" (1968, 15 ).
Weber's Economy and Society opens with a definition of sociology as a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects . Action is defined as bebavior whicb the agent attaches subjective meaning to. Tbe terms differ, and tbe emphasis in Weber's formulation in this particular text is on the epistemic problems the conception creates. But the model of action is almost identical. For Ihering, actions need have no visible manifestations. Similarly for Weber, for whom purely inward passivity, acquiescence, and omission are actions (1947, 88) . For Weber, action is 'social' if it takes account of the behavior of otbers. But even inward acts may have this quality. Tbus in an ultimate sense, action is inaccessible. For Ihering the inaccessibility is ontological: the will is a cause wbich is not caused. For Weber it is an epistemic matter: our interest is in intentional action, but intentions are ultimately epistemically inaccessible, though we may ordinarily find grounds for attributing them to agents.
Weber's terminology differs in one obvious respect. Where Ihering speaks of purposes, Weber speaks of meaning ["gemeinter Sinn"] interchangeably with 'purpose ' (1947, 93-4) . One reason for this isthat he wishes to make an epistemic point about understanding which holds both for propositions and for actions. But when he discusses explanatory understanding, by whicb he means understanding of motives, he uses meaning ["gemeinter Sinn"] . Hispoint with respect to motives, however, isthat they may be subdivided into rational and emotional, and in this respect he deviates from Ihering in a potentially significant way.
Ihering's aim was to rnake sense of law, to discem its underlying rationality, but to do so historically. For him, however, the fundamental problern was the transformation of egoism into law. Fundamentally he was a contractarian, who believed that an equilibrium of interests of the sort that underlies contracts underlies the law. But he also saw that interests evolved, both in the objective sense and with respect to subjective convictions about interest, that interests could be artificially created, and that judgments of self-interest could be in error. Consequently he believed in objective interests. But he conceded that subjective interests or the conviction of interest is decisive in actually or proximally bringing about agreement in wills between persons making contracts. The state was a special kind of contract in which force was justified by virtue of the fact that it was 'indispensable' to the realization of the contract. ·It may be noted that this form of argument vitiated Ihering's wbole argument, because his reasoning here was itself legalistic, which is to say it presupposed the body of practices it was used to justify. But we need not be concemed with this flaw yet -it tums out to be much more widespread.
When Ihering discusses simplest contractual phenomena he notes the role of what he calls "business eloquence" in beinging about a conviction of interest. Tbere is of course a legal issue here: the distinction between fraud, a beinging about of a conviction of interest on the basis of lies, wbich annuls a contract, and the kind of persuasion wbich does not. Persuasion need not merely promote artificial interests: it may aid one in the discovery of one' s self-interests. lhering makes little of this distinction, doubtless because he thinks that the raw facts of interest so widely predominate, and the interests at issue are so numerous, that fundamental errors about self-interest are not terribly significant. One Iist of interests he gives includes "entertainment, distraction, pleasure, vanity, ambition , social considerations, etc. • (1968, 30) . He adds more: satisfying the demands of duty and security from the dread of ennui. Suffice to say that these serve to make bis point about the pervasive role of "interest" in sociallife. The diversity of the Iist itself represents a de facto abandonment of the utilitarian idea of a felicific calculus with a single scale. But it also represents a dilution of the explanatory power of the concept of interest: interest becomes, potentially, not a fixed factor which explains diverse purposes, but a tenn that is the virtual equivalent of the specific purposes for wbich one acts.
The distinction between objective interests or purposes and subj ective ones is also open to a self-undennining extension. If "interests" can be made subjectively convincing without being in accordance with objective interests, could it not be that all or all of the operative interests in a given domain are artificial in· this sense? The explanatory significance of objective interests or purposes would disappear utterly in such a case. YetIhering gives no grounds for believing that this could not occur, or indeed was not the generat condition of social life and law. Doubtless he believed that this was notareal issue, because there would be genuine (but not general) de facto constraints on the process of creating the conviction of interest for artificial interests that would preclude the wholesale rise of novel artificial interests. He was bimself greatly concemed with the genealogy of such things as moral feelings and judicial sense, wbich he explained by habituation and the emergence of novel mutual interest in the continuation of practices or customs, such as tipping.
But tbis implicit constraint did not concem Weber , for reasons that are evident from Ihering's own account of the concept of interest and of the ideational representations of future possible states wbich promise greater satisfaction of interests (1968, 7) . Ihering sees that these representations may involve rewards that are purely 'ideal', such as honor. Elsewhere he speaks of ideal interests in contrast to material interests. In a famous passage, Weber asserts that "Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govem men's conduct. Yet very frequently the 'world images' that have been created by 'ideas' have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along wbich action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. 'From what' and 'for what' one wished tobe redeemed and, Iet us not forget, 'could be' redeemed, depended upon one's image of the world.
• (Weber 1946, 280) This is exactly Ihering's point. But Ihering made little of it, because to do so would undermine bis contractarian account of law and legal evolution. He con-sidered law to rest on a specific fixed interest: peace. He might bave believed that "honor• was not fundamental or equivalent to self-preservation and other such familiar utilitarian motives. He may bave supposed tbat history taught this, and that the lesson was that human motive was so composed that the causally dominant motives are pacific, the motive of honor incidental or peripheral. He may instead have supposed that "business eloquence" and its variants bad its Iimits and tbat even if human nature, and human motivation, was fundamentally plastic, the means for transforming it were limited in ways which limited the kinds of Iransformations of motive that are possible.
In the particular succession I have identified here, between Ihering and Weber, the motivations for the change may be traced to Nietzsche's Daybreak. Nietzsche inverted the genealogical story in which the pacific interests were 'rational' and dominant, and tumed the utilitarianism virtues into a product of a long genealogy, govemed by particular transformative processes of decay and degeneration. The process is familiar to modern rational choice thinkers. The slave morality of Christianity is sour grapes on a grand scale: the beliefs facilitate necessary Substitutions of satisfactions. Nietzsche also expanded the notion of transformation, treating ideals as matters of invention: in a memorable passage he writes of the factory in which ideals are fabricated.
The Epistelnie Problem
lhering bad attempted to discem the purposes behind action, so tbat the actions of animals, the habitual actions, and the like, could be treated as purposive. Weber considered these imputations of purpose unwarranted, and sought some narrower, epistemically justifiable, grounds for making imputations. Thus he drew the boundaries of action more narrowly, considering habitual bebavior to be on, indeed to define, the borderline of the category of action proper. At the same time, however, he insisted on the extent to which ordinary human behavior is habitual. So although the domain to which purpose applies shrinks for Weber, the shrinkage occurs largely in theory. In practice, individual purposes and meanings, may be rather freely attributed by the device of ideal-types.
To understand this, it is useful to begin with the case of a consciously intended action in which there is clear and unproblematic evidence of some sort of intention, such as a Statement of intention contemporaneous with the event. The centrality of this kind of case in the law is evident, as is the fact that legal decisions must be made on the basis of imperfect approximations to this ideal: confessions, indirect evidence of intention, such as flight, and circumstantial evidence of a conduct tbat cannot be interpreted as innocent. These considerations are familiar to readers of the opening pages of Economy and Society as weil.
Weber's approach is to identify three paradigms of action. One is the fully intentional type, which he calls rational action. The others are not fully intentional, and border on the domain of caused, meaningless, conduct. Habitual actions are treated as such a borderline case. lhering handled this case differently, by denying that Iack of a conscious intention made an act purposeless. Weber's other polar case is conduct which is purely reactive or emotional -here again, the roots of the distinction in legal issues of responsibility is evident.
Individual interests may be readily fit into this set of distinctions. They are the source of conscious ends, which may be eilher ultimate or interrnediate, that is to say ends that are, or provide means to, other ends. But actions with clear conscious intentions are rarities. Most conduct is habitual or causally deterrnined by bodily needs and the like. If one is perrnitted to discem hidden purposes in these actions and quasi-actions, one can perhaps also construct chains of purposes of a utilitarian type, and see these various actions and quasi-actions as contributing to some )arger or collective purpose, or arrange them in relation to one another in a way which exhibits them as satisfying purposes of a larger, collective kind. One may even then identify mechanisms by which these arrangements change and adapt to circumstances through feedback mechanisms, as Ihering did in bis account of law.
Weber blocked this kind of reasoning by a simple but disputable methodological rule: purposes could be attributed to conduct if and only if the agent or someone acting similarly explicitly adopted these purposes as values. In these cases, the fully intentional act provided the ideal-type from which the actual conduct of individuals deviated, by being partly habitual or partly reactive or emotional -in short, by falling into the region between these three polar idealtypes. This rule is a harsh check on teleological fantasies.
By applying this check, one sees that social teleological analysis and much eise besides requires one or another kind of loosening of the standards by which Intentions are attributed. lhering loosened them in one direction. Put in modern terms, intentional attributions are subject to a great deal of underdetermination. For Ihering, an attribution of purposes bad to be made to fit with the observable features of conduct, of course. But this rule did not reduce the underdeterrnination of intentional attributions by much. So he was free to select from the possible imputable purposes by reasoning circularly, on the basis of the )arger social ends he thought he could discem in legal evolution, and attributing to agents as their 'real' interests and motives the ones that served the larger social ends he could observe being fulfilled.
Rational cboice theory depends on loosening as weil, but in practice the loosening is even more radical. Purposes are attributed to the actions that make up aggregated pattems of action, and this is done eilher without regard to the evidence of actual individual intention or through the weak requirement of 'plausibility' of attributions. The real test for these attributions is that they 'explain' the aggregate pattem they are constructed to explain as rational choices of individual agems. In itself this is a stringent lest, sufficiently stringent that many pattems, such as the act of voting, appear to be beyond explanation, at least if one chooses to regard voting as instrumental, and to suppose that individuals have some sort of relatively coherent set of at least partially transitive preferences which allow for the substitution of ends .
Weber 's approach is different in a decisive respect that shows its closer kinship to the law. For Weber, the problern is to match up what Ihering calls the extemal aspects of an action with an ideal model of an act with a particular intention. The matehing process is essentially one in wbich the interpreter has a large set of possible types, corresponding to possible intentions, to which fit the observed features of the act. The intelligibility of the act is a matter of relations of adequacy intemal to the model of the action itself. Decisions are a subcategory of intelligible action. Ideals of rational decision-making can serve in rational reconstructions of particular complex actions, such as military decision-making in battle. But actions which may be characterized by comparison to the pattem of a simple intentional act do not require such an interpretation, nor do they need to be connected to higher or more ultimate purposes unless these connections are part of the consciousness of the individuals in question. Needless to say, a transitively coherent set of ends has no roJe in Weber's analysis, sa ve where coherent ends are part of a conscious ideal or conscious situation of choice. This is a crucial difference with respect to analyses which rest on the marginalist idea of SUbstitution, such as the 'sour grapes' pattern of explanation. But it derives from We~r's chosen model of action explanation, which does not involve such further ends.
Weber' s refusal to consider such further ends reflects his episternic reservations about the imputation of purposes. Whether these are warranted, and what status is to be accorded his choice of a framework of action explanation, are questions that arise between Ihering and Weber as well. Weber presents bis conception of sociology and of action as a set of defmitions that rnight be found useful , as a possible mode of description that one may select over other possible descriptive frameworks. It happens that this is the one that suits our interests as historians or as human scientists, as 'chernical' descriptions do not. The concept of interest-relativity Weber uses here may itself be traced to Ihering, for it was Ihering who stressed the interest-relative character of legal descriptions, which he understood in a neo-Kantian manner as abstractions from more primary stuff, and for which there are alternative schemes of abstraction reflecting different interests. But Ihering seerns to have considered his discussions of purpose and human agency to be conoerned with reality prior to abstraction into the specifically abstractive mode of the law, as indeed he was forced to if he wished to give a non-circular account of the genesis and character of this mode of abstraction: the human world was for him inherently or ontologically a world of purpose. Weber is more radical in his consideration of alternatives; the non-telic world of physical science description is also an alternative. lhering is perhaps not so different in substance. When he says that the fundamental idea of Zweck im Recht is "that purpose is the creator of the entire law; that there is no legal rule which does not owe its origin to a purpose, i.e., to a practical motive" (1968, LIV), he is concemed with the human domain, as defined by the human will, and the ways this domain is formed by the law. Weber differs only in not taking 'will' as a given but as, so to speak, frame-dependent. But for the relevant purposes in the human sciences, the intentional idiom is ineliminable and irreducible for Weber as for Ihering. Juristic purposes are among the possible frame-creating purposes which pertain to this domain and to which Weber repeatedly contrasts the cognitive purposes of sociology and history (1947, 90, 101; cf. Lask 1950) .
Ihering is more explicit about the ontological irreducibility of will to its causal determinants. For Weber, assertions about free will are unwarrantable metaphysical choices. But on interest-relative grounds we may simply concem ourselves ·with facts described intentionally, and if so our explanatory problems are already framed in terms of the formation of intentions and the consequences of intentional actions. In Ihering, in any event, the will is merely a place-holder; there is no volition without purpose, so there is no causally relevant autonomaus phenomenon of will. lt becomes, for Ihering, merely a name for the power to form purposes (1968, (6) (7) . Moreover, the question of the character of the will becomes, for Ihering, a matter of interests. He notes that the question of will is different for the jurist than for the psychologist (1968, (12) (13) , and remarks that the psychologist's claims are not fundamental. Emil. Lask, Weber's younger contemporary, commented on these issues and identified Ihering as the originator of the approach to the philosophy of law that recognizes a "concept-forming spirit inherent in the law" (1950, 30) which govems the ascent from the pre-scientific idiom to legal description. Weber's was simply a different ascent, govemed by a different concept-forrning spirit or interest.
lnterest-relativity at this Ievel, however, creates more difficulties than it solves. The problern for Ihering was, in part, to justify the claims of the law in an absolute, or at least non-interest-relative, way. The utilitarians also wished to justify institutions. There was a way out of this for Weber. Gustav Radbruch, bis friend and peer, treated the problern of adherence to the law as a matter of valuative choice. The ideal of adherence to the law happens to be implicated in most of the other choices ordinary people make, because most life goals require a legal order for their realization. But the choice is, in an ultimate sense, optional: Tolstoy served as his example of the Christian rejection of the law. Weber did not suppose that his analyses justified institutions or practices, and thus avoided this particular problern over relativity. Like Radbruch, he did not consider the law to be open to scientific justification, or justification from individual objective interests, as Ihering did, or indeed justification at all. Obedience, for him, was a matter of decision, of commitment to the institution as a value or for the value it serves. · What holds for j ustification holds also for explanation. The proj ect of explaining institutions in terms of interest is a project motivated by the idea that interests are more substantial, fundamental , and fixed than the things they explain -institutions, norms, beliefs, and the like. The Marxian theory of superstructure is another project of this kind. Rational choice models are a less ambitious project with a partly parallel structure: there is the same explanatory asymmetry, though the favored starting point in this case is individual preferences and decisions.
To explain a subversion of rationality such as the joint alteration of preferences and beliefs -to believe the grapes are sour and choose some other good -in the face of the unattainability of some preferred end requires at least some given preferences, which are to be adjusted. Whether these preferences are Iaken to derive merely from contingencies, such as acculturation, or from something more basic, such as human nature, is a matter of intellectual strategy. The notion of preferences, however, forces the question of the status and nature of the preferences. lf this mode of analysis is to be employed, there must be preferences to be modified. They may be 'revealed' by the decision patterns of the agent, which is to say imputed circularly as necessary conditions for the decisions, or they may be assumed to correspond tp some sort of fact that is more fundamental than preferences.
'Objective interests' is one more such fundamental fact : failure to act in accordance with these interests may then be treated asymmetrically as intellectual 'error '. The concept defines an asymmetric explanatory structure in which the fixed and unproblematic character of the normal case is assumed, and only deviations from it are explained. Weber was sensitive to such explanatory asymmetries, and this was one of the reasons for his doctrine of ideal-types. He could say that conformity to the ideal-type explained nothing. Ideal types of intentional actions did provide the link of intelligibility which Ihering had called the law of purpose which govemed the intemal stage of action . But for Weber, as for Ihering, the explanations had alsotobe causally adequate. For Weber, this meant that any imputed intentions bad to have probable causal consequences for the imputation to serve as an explanation.
In one key aspect, however, Weber's account of action introduces a new asymmetry. The affect of Ihering's and Weber 's successive liberalizations of the concept of interest is to substitute for a single, fundamental explanatory asymmetry a !arge set of explanatory asymmetries. Bach appeal to an ultimate value in an explanation of an act is an appeal to something which, in the Weberian scheme, has no further explanation. Bach 'value', accordingly, is the final term in the explanations that appeal to them. Many of Weber's successors considered this inadequate, and sought to provide alternative accounts. In general, these implicitly rejected bis identification of the normative realm with those values which had explicitly been formulated and were accepted as ideals. Why did Weber hirnself not consider 'ultimate values' to be unsatisfactory as explanatory facts? The answer to this question is doubtless to be found in his own practice. Although Weber did not provide a gmeral theory of values, such as Ihering's, he was nevertheless greatly concemed, as Ihering was, with the historical development of ideals. In particular, he sought to provide accounts of the practical consequences of ideals and the ways in which these practical consequences affected the development of the ideals. He thought of these as specific historical accounts, however, not as elements of a generat theory of values or value transformation.
3. Intelligibility, Invention, and Reception . lt may be questioned as to whether the devices he used to account for these changes in ideals were adequate, or whether thinking of the normative realm solely in terms of ideals and habits is sufficient (cf. Tumer/Factor 1990). But it is evident that this model gives Weber a distinctive historical vision, definitely at variance with Ihering's rationalistic evolutionism. Weber seldom says much about the fabrication of ideals, but in 1he Protestallt Ethic, we are. given a glimpse of the factory in which they are made. The thesis of the study depends on the idea of the originality of the conjunction of the ideas of 'worldly callings' and 'predestination' . Predestination was then interpreted pastorall y to serve as a sanction for behavior in accordance with the worldly calling of the believer. The dogrna was ultimately habitualized over several centuries to become the distinctively Protestant demeanor and attitude toward life.
Weber says little about the conditions under which such doctrines are received and accepted or rejected. His account of charisrna identifies one kind of persuasion, in which the persuasive force of the ideals is connected to the process by which the charismatic Ieader is tested and brings success -success in terms of his own beliefs and pronouncements -to bis followers and bis cause. This is not an account of the initial persuasive power of ideals. But it is a radical extension of the notion of "business eloquence" as it appears in Ihering, and it proceeds by ignoring the notion that the primary basis for the success of a sales pitch is that it reveals interests that the purchaser possessed but did not recognize. These two changes mean that the de facto constraints or changes in ideals which govemed Ihering's account disappear in Weber.
Because of Weber's insistence that the normative realm consists of no more than conscious value-choice and habitualized forms of these choices, no other normative constraints figure in bis account. So, in theory at least, the range of contingency in the formation of preferences is.wide: it is possible for people tobe persuaded of ideals of all sorts, given the right kind of Ieader, and there are few if any Iimits enforced by 'natural' interests or preferences. Consecrated death on the battlefield, indeed, is given as an example of an end which bestows ultimate meaning on life. But it is difficult to reconcile this preference, which undoubtedly has motivated many persons, with any utilitarian or quasi-utilitarian account of action. To be sure, one may come to the conviction of the value of consecrated death on the battlefield through the process of substitution of beliefs and preferences Elster calls 'sour grapes'. But if the process of substitution in the realm of ideals permits such radical Iransformations of prior preferences, it constrains nothing and thus explains nothing. The constraints, and hence the explanation, must be found elsewhere -if there are indeed constraints at all.
Weber's account of action, Ihering's as weil, allow for this Iack of constraint because of tbe openness of the 'inner' moment in action, govemed only by what Ihering calls the law of purpose. Weber is much more cautious about the absolute freedom of the will, though characteristically the caution is epistemic. Rather, lhering says that the will is bound only by the Iimits of the intelligibility of reasons for actions. This is in any case not a real constraint but a constraint on the acceptability of explanations of actions cailed intentional. Weber accepts this constraint -it is what he means by "adequacy at the Ievel of meaning". But be points out that "conscious motives" may weil, even to the agent himself, be misleading with respect to the actual causes of the behavior in question (1947, 97) . Such behavior is on one of Weber's 'borderlines' between action and causally determined behavior. The epistemic peculiarity of this case, as with other cases in Weber's classification of action, is that the category in which conduct is placed depends on the true explanation of the act. If the real cause is hidden, it will remain hidden unless no sense may be made of the behavior by matehing to permissible ideal-types -the permissible ideal types being those in which, in their pure form, involve conscious intentions. Implicitly, these can serve to make sense only of unconscious aims or habitual actions in whicb the fact of unconsciousness of the admixture of habil can be accounted for appropriately. But accounting for them seems to require knowledge of real, non-interest relative causal facts.
Whether one considers the constraints imposed by tbe requirement of adequacy on the Ievel of meaning here to be constraints on conduct or constraints on possible explanation, it is evident that little is constrained. Yet there are two kinds of considerations which this discussion reveals which might be extended, and if extended would provide constraints both on possible explanations and possible modes of behavior. The consideration of intelligibility, especially when it is relaxed to allow for deviations from the model of consciously intended action in the direction of admixtures of habit and emotional reaction, seems very weak. But it may be strengthened by a set of considerations to which Weber adverts, but which be does not elaborate.
As we bave seen, Weber grasps, as any successor of Nietzsche would, that rationalizations are given for customs (1947, 123) , that reasoned actions become routinized and then habitual, and more generally that historical Iransformations of ideas follow more or Iess typical patterns. But Weber does not, except in bis discussions of the conditions for preserving charisma, say much about the ways in which either the invention or reception of ideals is constrained. Yet it is evident, and evident from bis own accounts of the messages of the Hebrew prophets, that the reception of novel ideals is constrained by the consideration of what is intelligible to the hearer. lt is also evident that the formation of ideas is constrained by the intellectual traditions and circumstances of the innovator, by the raw material, so to speak, available to the factory in which ideals are made. The pragmatic aspects of the reproduction of ideals and habits, on which Weber briefly comments in connection with Gabriet Tarde's theory of imitation, provide yet other constraints.
Ihering's law of purpose, and Weber's more cumbersome replacement for it, are given some substantive force through these constraints. Purposes and beliefs do not arise and arenot received randomly or merely through 'sour grapes' substitution. They are intelligible, in the full sense of being accepted as genuine grounds for action and belief, only to persons with the appropriate training or upbringing and within a certain historical mental horizon of choice. Put simply, it is the constraints of tradition, a category Weber tries to reductively eliminate in favor of habit (Tumer/Factor 1990) , that would put some explanatory force into the model of action Weber constructs. The Iimits to our understanding of the invention and adoption of ideas and ideals are to be found in the limitations of the genealogical accounts we may give of them. These are 'retail constraints', in contrast to the wholesale constraints of the theory of 'superstructure' or of the evolution of rights. But they are constraints nevertheless.
Afterword
The century of sociology, the period between 1880 and 1980, saw the development of an extraordinary set of strange doctrines devised to reconcile the collective facts of the state, law, and social institutions with the facts of intentional action as understood pre-scientifically. Some of the most influential attempts were renovations of the conception of intentional action itself. Others posited collective analogues, such as Tönnies' 'social will' and Durkheim's 'collective conscience', to individual intention. Others, lik:e Parsons and the behaviorists, sought to replace the intentional idiom entirely. Rational choice theory, as I have suggested, is an attempt to relax the epistemic requirements of individual intentional attributions and substitute the consideration of consistency with aggregate pattems of action. Each of these revisions (and indeed the Kantian notion of will itself) are attempts to revise the language of intention so that something (logical consistency, in Kant) does the explanatory or constraining work that intentional ta1k alone does not do.
These attempts are doomed to failure. The gravitational pull of the intentional idiom is such that theorizations, renovations, and replacements do not have much value beyond the special explanatory purposes for which they are constructed. In this respect, Weber was correct to specify his purposes and the limited, purposerelative signifi.cance of the results he could achieve, and to avoid the circularity which would have been produced, for example, by an attempt to explain or j ustify institutions as such, which would have required a base in a concept of action which could itself be independently validated. There are no such grounds. Theseare only, as he saw, ungroundable interests or preferences, or eise circular argumentssuch as Ihering's.
The question with which I began can perhaps be answered in these terms. Parsons' scheme and rational choice theories are attempts to go beyond the limitations of the intentional idiom, in the former case by replacing it with a novel descriptive vocabulary of 'orientation', in the latter by relaxing and replacing the constraints on attributing reasons for actions. They are a series in the sense that they are a series of failures. The intentional idiom resists theorization and improvement, as it prevents our abandoning it.
